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Luiz Bines: Department of Economics, PUC-Rio (email: [luizbines@gmail.com](mailto:luizbines@gmail.com)); Juliano Assuncao: Department of Economics, PUC-Rio (email: [juliano@econ.puc-rio.br](mailto:juliano@econ.puc-rio.br)); Ricardo Dahis: Department of Economics, Monash University (email: [ricardo.dahis@monash.edu](mailto:ricardo.dahis@monash.edu)).

# Echoes of Terrorism: Examining the Effects of Siren Alerts Timing on Voter Preferences in Israel\*

Luiz Bines<sup>†</sup>

Juliano Assunção<sup>‡</sup>

Ricardo Dahis<sup>§</sup>

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## Abstract

This study investigates the effects of "Red Alerts", siren warnings of rocket threats, on voting behavior in Israel, focusing on the Likud party during the 2013 and 2015 elections. Using a novel dataset on Red Alert timing and location, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to compare voting patterns in areas newly exposed to Gaza's rocket range in 2014. Our analysis shows that Red Alerts on the days immediately before the election boosted Likud's vote share by 2.5 p.p., or 15% of the average, while earlier alerts had no significant effect, highlighting the impact of threat salience on electoral outcomes. This research advances our understanding of how security threats influence political behavior.

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\*Any errors are our own.

<sup>†</sup>Department of Economics, PUC-Rio. Email: luizbines@gmail.com.

<sup>‡</sup>Department of Economics, PUC-Rio. Email: juliano@econ.puc-rio.br.

<sup>§</sup>Department of Economics, Monash University. Email: ricardo.dahis@monash.edu.

# 1 Introduction

Can terror threats impact voting behavior even if the terror act never actually materializes? In particular, if national security becomes a salient issue just days before an election, voters may shift support toward parties perceived as strong on defense. Studying this question empirically rigorously requires a situation where national security is made salient over time across locations, but holding constant actual damages from terrorist attacks. So far, this challenge has not been addressed by the literature.

In this paper, we quantify how the salience of terror attacks impacts voting preferences in the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel has been regularly subjected to rocket attacks from Gaza. In response, the Israeli government has developed several defense mechanisms, the most prominent being the Iron Dome, a missile defense system that intercepts rockets with a success rate of over 90%. Alongside this, a widespread siren alert system was established to provide immediate warnings of incoming rocket fire - "Red Alerts". These sirens give residents critical time to seek shelter before the Iron Dome takes action, making them a vital component of Israel's civilian defense. We introduce a novel dataset that tracks the timing and location of Red Alerts since 2014.

We examine whether exposure to sirens before elections influences voting behavior, specifically focusing on the vote share for the right-wing Likud party, which was in power during the conflict. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare voting patterns in localities that experienced Red Alerts shortly before the election to those that did not. Our findings suggest a significant behavioral effect: exposure to Red Alerts in the immediate days before the election increases Likud's vote share by approximately 2.5 p.p., or 15% of the average. However, this effect is short-term, as localities that experienced alerts many days prior to the election did not show a significant change in voting behavior.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. [Section 2](#) provides a review of the relevant literature on the impact of rocket attacks on Israeli voting preferences, as well as salience theory. [Section 3](#) provides the political context for Israel during the 2014 war and outlines Israel's defensive measures, detailing the functioning of the Red Alert siren system. [Section 4](#) introduces the data employed in this study. [Section 5](#) presents the empirical strategy. [Section 7](#) presents the main findings and discusses their implications. [Section 8](#) concludes with a summary of the key results.

## 2 Related Literature

The literature examining the relationship between rocket attacks and electoral outcomes in Israel consistently suggests that targeted localities tend to shift politically to the right. However, previous studies either include untargeted localities or exclude

areas that did not experience direct attacks, overlooking a key element of exposure: Red Alerts, i.e. the warnings issued when rocket launches are identified. Despite their potential influence, no previous research has focused on how these alerts affect voter behavior.

An approach in the literature focuses on susceptibility to rocket attacks. For example, [Getmansky and Zeitzoff \(2014\)](#) utilizes advancements in rocket technology to estimate the effect of being within rocket range on right-wing voting. However, Red Alert data shows that less than 56% of the localities entering rocket range in 2014 were actually targeted until the 2015 election, suggesting that simply being within range does not fully capture the effect of the threat. Similarly, [Elster \(2019\)](#) examines property damage claims to assess the impact of rocket fire on political preferences, finding that affected areas tend to favor right-wing parties. However, since 90% of the rockets are intercepted by the Iron Dome, this focus on material damage potentially excludes many areas that experienced the psychological threat of rocket fire without physical damage.

The link between terror threats and electoral behavior is further explored by [Berrebi and Klor \(2006\)](#), who develop a theoretical model showing that terrorism shifts political support toward right-wing parties. Their empirical analysis of terrorist attacks in Israel between 1990 and 2003 finds that higher levels of terrorism increase support for right-wing parties, as voters prioritize security concerns. However, their analysis focuses on actual terrorist events rather than the psychological effects of perceived threats, such as those posed by Red Alerts.

The psychological effects of terrorist threats are further emphasized in [Amarasinghe \(2023\)](#), which explores the short-term dynamics of public sentiment following terror attacks. Even unsuccessful attacks can lead to increased public discontent, but countries with greater exposure to terrorism and higher investments in counter-terrorism, such as Israel, are less likely to penalize the government. This underscores the importance of perceived government effectiveness in mitigating voter backlash, aligning with our focus on how Red Alerts influence electoral behavior through the lens of perceived, rather than material, threats.

Relatedly, [Hinton and Vaishnav \(2023\)](#) analyze the impact of a major pre-election terrorist attack in India, revealing that national security crises can produce complex electoral effects. Although such events often trigger a rally-around-the-flag effect, their study challenges the notion that terror threats consistently benefit nationalist parties, demonstrating that voter responses to perceived and actual threats can diverge. This complexity mirrors the potential divergence in Israel, where frequent Red Alerts may evoke psychological reactions that either bolster or erode support for the government, depending on how voters perceive the threat and the state's response.

The emotional and psychological dimensions of political decision-making in conflict settings are further explored by [Webster and Albertson \(2022\)](#), who show how emotional responses to political events can lead to polarization and influence voters' information processing. In the case of Red Alerts, the heightened emotional salience of

these warnings may distort voter preferences by prompting them to overemphasize security concerns, which could result in political shifts toward parties promising tougher stances on national security. This ties in with the broader framework of salience theory.

In addition, the growing literature on salience theory ([Bordalo et al., 2020, 2022](#)) shows how highly salient stimuli can distort decision-making by shifting attention to certain issues at the expense of others. In the case of Red Alerts, these repeated warnings may act as such stimuli, leading voters to over-prioritize security concerns and the Israel-Palestine conflict when casting their vote.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on Red Alerts as a key factor influencing voting behavior, rather than just the physical impact of rocket attacks. By analyzing the effects of perceived threat through alerts, we provide a more nuanced understanding of how exposure to terror influences electoral decisions, addressing the gap left by studies focused solely on direct attacks. Additionally, by applying insights from salience theory, we demonstrate how nonmaterial, psychological exposure to terror can distort voter preferences, broadening the scope of behavioral political economy in conflict settings.

### 3 Context

Since Hamas assumed control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel has imposed a blockade on the region. The ongoing threat of terror attacks, especially rocket strikes from Gaza, has led the Israeli government to invest heavily in defense, including the development of the Iron Dome. The Iron Dome is an advanced aerial defense system capable of intercepting rockets and mortars midair, with an interception success rate of approximately 90% ([Kattan, 2018](#)).

In addition to the Iron Dome, every locality in Israel is equipped with a robust siren system that provides immediate alerts to residents in the event of incoming rockets targeting their vicinity, referred to hereafter as “Red Alerts”.<sup>1</sup> This means that citizens are instructed to seek shelter while the Iron Dome system attempts to intercept the rockets.

When a Red Alert is triggered, all residents in the affected locality are instructed to seek shelter immediately. These alerts operate independently from the Iron Dome, and a single rocket can trigger alerts across multiple localities depending on their proximity. Additionally, multiple rockets can result in a single alert, meaning that Red Alerts do not always correlate directly with the number of rockets fired or specific localities attacked.

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<sup>1</sup>“Locality” is the official term used by the Israeli government to refer to any municipal unit recognized by the Ministry of Interior. This encompasses both urban and rural municipalities as well as local councils.

During the 2014 Israel-Hamas war, the range of Hamas rockets expanded from 75 km to 150 km, endangering Israeli localities previously considered out of reach. Our analysis focuses on localities situated within the 75-150 km range, focusing on those newly exposed to rocket fire during this period.

We classify Israeli localities between 75 and 150 km from Gaza into categories: a control group and two treatment groups. The control group consists of localities that did not experience Red Alerts between the 2013 and 2015 legislative elections. The treatment groups include localities that were exposed to Red Alerts either 200-250 days before the 2015 election or within the six days leading up to the election. It is noteworthy that no alerts were issued in this range during the period between these two time windows.

Despite extensive rocket attacks, only two Israeli civilians were killed during the conflict. This low casualty count is largely attributed to the success of the Iron Dome and Red Alert systems (Kurz and Brom, 2014).

On the political front, the right-wing Likud party, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, held power from 2009 to 2021 and regained it in 2023. Our study focuses on Likud's vote share, as its uninterrupted time in office under Netanyahu makes it a crucial indicator of political sentiment.

During the 2014 conflict, Netanyahu's popularity surged, with his approval rating climbing from below 50% to nearly 80% (Feinstein, 2018). We argue that exposure to Red Alerts significantly influenced voting behavior, resulting in higher support for Netanyahu and Likud in affected localities.

Israel, a parliamentary state, requires a coalition of 61 seats out of 120 to form a government. Likud's coalition held exactly 61 chairs in the 2015 election. This means that the impact of Red Alerts on voters' preferences since the 2014 war may have been decisive towards the formation of Likud's coalition.

We argue that the role played by the siren alerts significantly influenced the electoral preferences of those affected by them, leading to a higher vote share for the Prime Minister's party Likud.

## 4 Data

We use a novel dataset consisting of Red Alert warnings issued by Israel's military authority responsible for civil protection, the Home Front Command.

When a rocket threat is detected, the Home Front Command not only activates sirens in the targeted areas, but also issues an online alert on their official website.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Link: <https://www.oref.org.il>.

Through web scraping, we have compiled a comprehensive dataset of these alerts, spanning from July 2014 (the earliest available records) to the present. Each entry in the dataset contains the date of the alert and the locality or cluster of localities targeted. Non-rocket-related alerts, such as test alarms, were filtered out to focus solely on genuine rocket attack warnings.

Information on the evolving range of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip was obtained from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>3</sup>

Locality-level demographic information was sourced from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, capturing variables such as total area, population size, primary religion, and age distribution. Additionally, we use harmonized nighttime luminosity as a proxy to the level of economic development (Henderson et al., 2012; Li et al., 2020).

Lastly, the number of votes per party for each locality was extracted from the records of the Israeli Central Elections Committee.

We exclude localities where Islam is the predominant religion and the majority of the population identifies as Arab. These areas are rarely targeted, resulting in the absence of Red Alerts. Furthermore, their voting patterns differ significantly from those of other localities, rendering them unsuitable for inclusion in the control group. Notably, these localities account for only 14% of the areas located between 75 and 150 km from the Gaza Strip.

## 5 Empirical Strategy

Using a *difference-in-differences* approach, we compare how treated and untreated localities voted in the 2013 (before entering the rocket range) and in the 2015 (after entering the rocket range) legislative elections.<sup>4</sup>

The *difference-in-differences* model is estimated using the following equation:

$$Likud_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot RedAlert_i + \beta \cdot Post_t + \gamma \cdot RedAlert_i \cdot Post_t + \theta * X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

Here,  $Likud_{i,t}$  represents the Likud vote share in locality  $i$  during election  $t$  (2013 or 2015);  $RedAlert_i$  is a dummy variable indicating whether there were any Red Alerts in locality  $i$  between the 2013 and the 2015 elections;  $Post_t$  is a dummy variable that equals 0 for the 2013 election (pre-treatment period) and 1 for the 2015 election (post-treatment period);  $X_{i,t}$  is a vector containing control variables for locality  $i$  during election  $t$ ; and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is an error term. The adopted control variables are demographic

<sup>3</sup>Link: <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/range-of-fire-from-gaza>.

<sup>4</sup>Israel is a parliamentary state. Therefore, the Prime Minister is the head of state, and is indirectly decided as a result of the legislative election.



density, population size, distance from the Gaza Strip, nighttime luminosity level (as a proxy of economic development), area, and locality-level fixed effects.

The variable  $RedAlert_i \cdot Post_t$  represents the interaction effect of how much experiencing a Red Alert impacts the share of Likud votes in the 2015 election in the locality  $i$ . Our parameter of interest is  $\gamma$ , which measures the difference in the share of Likud votes between the 2013 and 2015 elections and between the treated and untreated localities.

We consider the occurrence of Red Alerts as exogenous to localities. The probability that a given locality will experience a Red Alert at any point in time is independent of whether it has experienced a Red Alert before. This exogeneity ensures that Red Alerts can be considered as an unexpected and random shock in our analysis. As such, since the occurrence of a Red Alert does not alter the future probability of Red Alerts, it should not systematically affect voting behavior through anticipation, allowing us to isolate its immediate salience on electoral preferences.

In addition to using Likud's vote share as a dependent variable, we extend our analysis to include the combined vote share of all right-wing parties.<sup>5</sup> This broader measure allows us to capture any general shifts in voter preferences towards right-leaning parties in response to Red Alerts, beyond just Likud. By examining the entire right-wing bloc, we can assess whether the impact of Red Alerts is specific to Likud or reflects a wider ideological shift toward right-wing parties.

In addition, we also analyze voter turnout as a dependent variable to determine whether Red Alerts not only shape voter preferences but also influence electoral participation. This is key to understanding the broader political implications of security threats. An increase in turnout could suggest that Red Alerts not only shift the preferences of existing voters, but also mobilize previously disengaged individuals, particularly those who feel more compelled to vote due to heightened security concerns. Conversely, if there is no effect on turnout but a change in vote shares, it would indicate that Red Alerts primarily sway the choices of those already inclined to vote, rather than expanding the pool of voters. By examining both vote shares and turnout, our aim is to provide a more complete understanding of how security threats shape electoral outcomes.

## 6 Descriptive Statistics

Following the empirical strategy detailed in [Section 5](#), we are able to compare the 2013 and 2015 voting patterns for each group, as well as their demographic variables. [Table 1](#) presents the relevant descriptive statistics for each group.

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<sup>5</sup>We follow established classifications in the literature to determine which parties are considered right-wing, applying consistent criteria to newer parties as well.



It is clear that the three groups presented similar voting patterns in 2013, concerning Likud's vote share, the right-wing block's vote share, and the population turnout. In addition, they are typically small in terms of area, and, although the mean distance to the Gaza Strip varies between groups, the average time to seek shelter after a Red Alert is virtually the same for all localities.

However, it is worth noticing that the group of localities that experienced Red Alerts 6 days before the 2015 election are considerably different to the other two groups in terms of population size and density. In fact, these localities tend to be smaller in size, less dense and less populated. The night lights level is also lower, which indicates an also lower economic development.

[Figure 2](#) compares the share of Likud votes between the three groups over time. Before the 2015 election (period 0), the three groups presented parallel trends. However, in 2015, the localities that experienced Red Alerts 6 days before the election presented, on average, a much higher share of votes to Likud.

Following the empirical strategy outlined in [Section 5](#), we compare the 2013 and 2015 voting patterns and demographic characteristics across groups. [Table 1](#) presents the relevant descriptive statistics for each group.

The three groups showed similar voting patterns in 2013, including Likud's vote share, the right-wing bloc's vote share, and voter turnout. Additionally, all groups are relatively small in area. While the average distance to the Gaza Strip varies, the time to reach shelter after a Red Alert is nearly identical across all localities.

Notably, the group of localities experiencing Red Alerts 6 days before the 2015 election differs significantly from the other two groups in population size and density. These localities tend to be smaller, less densely populated, and exhibit lower night light intensity, indicating a lower level of economic development.

[Figure 2](#) illustrates the evolution of Likud's vote share across the three groups. Before the 2015 election (period 0), the groups showed parallel trends. However, in 2015, localities that experienced Red Alerts 6 days before the election showed a significantly higher average vote share for Likud.

## 7 Results

We present the regression results of the difference-in-differences estimator in [Table 2](#). The first line measures the effect of Red Alerts occurring six days before the 2015 election, while the second line assesses the impact of alerts issued more than 200 days before the election.

Columns (1) and (2) analyze Likud's vote share, columns (3) and (4) focus on the right-wing vote share, and columns (5) and (6) evaluate voter turnout. The analysis reveals

that Red Alerts occurring six days before the election have a statistically significant positive effect on Likud's vote share in the post-election period, with coefficients of 2.5% and 2.6% in columns (1) and (2), both significant at the 5% level. This means that experiencing a Red Alert 6 days before the 2015 election led to an additional 2.5% vote share for Likud, on average.

This is an important figure: since the Israeli parliament is made up of 120 chairs, 2.5% translates to 3 seats. However, it is important to note that when weighted by population size, considering only our sample, the overall impact would not be relevant.

In contrast, Red Alerts occurring more than 200 days before the election do not significantly affect Likud's vote share.

The results in [Table 2](#) suggest that the impact of Red Alerts on voting behavior is largely short-term. The significant and positive effect of the alerts that occurred just 6 days before the 2015 election on Likud's vote share suggests that these alerts raise security concerns, pushing voters to favor the incumbent party, often seen as stronger on defense and national security.

However, Red Alerts in the days immediately preceding the 2015 election do not show a corresponding increase in the vote share for the broader right-wing bloc. In fact, the data shows that alerts occurring more than 200 days before the election have a negative effect on the right-wing vote share. This indicates that voters are not necessarily becoming more ideologically right-leaning in response to these threats. Instead, the shift towards Likud likely reflects other factors. As Likud was in power during the alerts, voters may associate the party with the handling of security threats like rocket attacks, the effectiveness of the Iron Dome system, and the use of sirens. These factors, rather than purely political ideology, may explain the increased support for Likud during periods of heightened security concerns.

Likud was the party in power during the Red Alerts, perceived as stronger on defense and national security. This heightened security concern likely fades over time, as evidenced by the lack of a significant effect from Red Alerts that occurred more than 200 days before the election. The absence of a long-term impact suggests that voters' responses to security threats are driven by recent and immediate experiences rather than past events, even when those events were similarly threatening.

The results in [Table 2](#) also indicate that there is no significant impact of Red Alerts on voter turnout. Despite the increased security concerns following the alerts, there is no evidence to suggest that these events motivated more voters to participate in the election. This absence of a turnout effect further underscores that the influence of Red Alerts is likely concentrated on shaping voter preferences rather than mobilizing additional voters to the polls. In other words, Red Alerts seem to sway those already engaged in the electoral process towards the incumbent Likud party, but they do not appear to bring new voters into the fold. This reinforces the idea that the shift towards Likud is more about concerns over security and leadership than broader ideological or political realignment across the electorate.

This short-term effect aligns with the broader understanding of how salience shapes voter behavior. Security concerns are most acute when the threat is fresh in the minds of voters, prompting a shift toward political parties that emphasize security measures. Over time, as the immediacy of the threat diminishes and other issues come to the forefront, the influence of past security events wanes. Therefore, while Red Alerts shortly before an election can significantly sway voter preferences, this effect seems to dissipate relatively quickly, indicating that such events are likely to have only a transient impact on electoral outcomes.

## 8 Conclusion

This study illustrates the significant impact of immediate security threats on electoral outcomes in Israel, specifically through the lens of the siren alert system. Our findings indicate that exposure to Red Alerts prior to elections can influence voters to favor the incumbent party, which they associate with providing protection during periods of conflict. This relationship underscores the critical role that perceived security risks play in shaping political behavior and voter preferences.

Furthermore, the short-term nature of the behavioral effect observed in our analysis suggests that voters are primarily influenced by recent experiences of threat rather than long-standing conditions. Localities that experienced alerts at a considerable temporal distance from the election did not demonstrate significant changes in voting behavior. The observed short-term effect of these alerts emphasizes that the impact on electoral outcomes is not merely a reflection of general security sentiments but rather a specific reaction to recent experiences of threat.

Ultimately, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how contextual factors, particularly salient security threats, influence agent behavior. By analyzing the intersection of rocket attacks, Red Alerts, and voting patterns, we illuminate the role of immediate environmental stimuli in shaping electoral preferences. This focus on salience improves our understanding of voting dynamics in conflict-affected regions and underscores the importance of considering the impact of such stimuli in electoral analysis.

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# Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Groups of Interest for 2013 and 2015

| Statistic                                 | No Red Alerts         |                       |        | Last Red Alert 200+ Days Before |                       |        | Last Red Alert 6 Days Before |                      |       |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|------------------------------|----------------------|-------|
|                                           | 2013                  | 2015                  | Diff   | 2013                            | 2015                  | Diff   | 2013                         | 2015                 | Diff  |
| Likud's Vote Share (%)                    | 15.47<br>(11.51)      | 16.00<br>(12.16)      | 0.53   | 15.92<br>(10.52)                | 16.81<br>(12.23)      | 0.89   | 16.40<br>(13.50)             | 19.47<br>(17.95)     | 3.07  |
| Right Wing Vote Share (%)                 | 30.33<br>(24.71)      | 30.78<br>(25.40)      | 0.45   | 27.18<br>(19.60)                | 25.69<br>(18.84)      | -1.49  | 32.49<br>(27.94)             | 33.64<br>(28.49)     | 1.15  |
| Turnout (%)                               | 73.31<br>(10.15)      | 75.54<br>(8.88)       | 2.23   | 74.40<br>(9.01)                 | 77.11<br>(8.51)       | 2.71   | 72.56<br>(7.39)              | 74.94<br>(5.91)      | 2.38  |
| Night Lights (0-63)                       | 52.14<br>(17.01)      | 50.59<br>(16.88)      | -1.55  | 55.87<br>(11.23)                | 53.69<br>(12.06)      | -2.18  | 44.07<br>(14.56)             | 44.18<br>(13.12)     | 0.11  |
| Population Size                           | 6972.48<br>(30201.29) | 7170.30<br>(31059.82) | 197.82 | 4781.20<br>(14617.79)           | 5021.60<br>(15343.57) | 240.40 | 2305.05<br>(6791.77)         | 2363.20<br>(6934.71) | 58.15 |
| Population Density (per km <sup>2</sup> ) | 1702.77<br>(1806.25)  | 1778.76<br>(1840.34)  | 76.00  | 3986.70<br>(19477.63)           | 4590.88<br>(23748.37) | 604.18 | 1110.42<br>(980.23)          | 1158.48<br>(1038.37) | 48.06 |
| Area (km <sup>2</sup> )                   |                       | 3.83<br>(9.98)        |        |                                 | 3.03<br>(7.53)        |        |                              | 2.22<br>(4.79)       |       |
| Distance to Gaza (km)                     |                       | 107.55<br>(20.73)     |        |                                 | 97.11<br>(19.17)      |        |                              | 134.76<br>(6.86)     |       |
| Observations                              | 158                   |                       |        | 83                              |                       |        | 116                          |                      |       |

"No Red Alerts" comprises the localities that experienced no Red Alerts between the 2013 and 2015 Legislative Elections.

"Last Red Alert 200+ Days Before" comprises the localities that experienced their last Red Alert 200+ days before the 2015 Legislative Election.

"Last Red Alert 6 Days Before" comprises the localities that experienced their last Red Alerts 6 days before the 2015 Legislative Election.

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 2: Differences-in-Differences Estimates: Red Alert Impact on the Right Wing Vote Share, 2013 and 2015 Elections

|                                     | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 | (5)                 | (6)                  |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Red Alert 6 Days Before * Post      | 0.025**<br>(0.008)  | 0.026*<br>(0.012)   | 0.007<br>(0.006)    | 0.005<br>(0.009)    | 0.001<br>(0.005)    | 0.001<br>(0.007)     |
| Red Alert 200+ Days Before * Post   | 0.004<br>(0.007)    | 0.003<br>(0.010)    | −0.019**<br>(0.006) | −0.016*<br>(0.007)  | 0.005<br>(0.005)    | 0.004<br>(0.007)     |
| Red Alert 6 Days Before Election    | 0.009<br>(0.017)    | 0.100***<br>(0.011) | 0.022<br>(0.036)    | 0.248***<br>(0.009) | −0.007<br>(0.012)   | 0.069***<br>(0.008)  |
| Red Alert 200+ Days Before Election | 0.004<br>(0.016)    | 0.262***<br>(0.032) | −0.032<br>(0.031)   | 0.444***<br>(0.026) | 0.011<br>(0.014)    | −0.214***<br>(0.024) |
| Post                                | 0.005<br>(0.005)    | 0.005<br>(0.007)    | 0.005<br>(0.004)    | 0.006<br>(0.006)    | 0.022***<br>(0.003) | 0.023***<br>(0.004)  |
| Intercept                           | 0.155***<br>(0.010) | 0.428***<br>(0.097) | 0.303***<br>(0.021) | 1.442***<br>(0.077) | 0.733***<br>(0.009) | 0.062<br>(0.070)     |
| Observations                        | 306                 | 305                 | 306                 | 305                 | 306                 | 305                  |
| Control Variables                   | No                  | Yes                 | No                  | Yes                 | No                  | Yes                  |
| Locality Fixed Effects              | No                  | Yes                 | No                  | Yes                 | No                  | Yes                  |
| Clustered Errors                    | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                  |
| Control Group                       | NRA 2015            | NRA 2015            | NRA 2015            | NRA 2015            | NRA 2015            | NRA 2015             |
| Dependent Variable                  | Likud               | Likud               | Right Wing          | Right Wing          | Turnout             | Turnout              |

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.

NRA 2015 stands for No Red Alerts until the 2015 Election.

Columns (1) and (2) estimate the impact of Red Alerts on Likud's vote share, columns (3) and (4) estimate the impact on Right-Wing parties' vote share, and columns (5) and (6) estimate the impact on voter turnout.

"Red Alert 6 Days Before" indicates municipalities that experienced their last Red Alert 6 days before the 2015 Legislative Election.

"Red Alert 200+ Days Before" indicates municipalities that experienced their last Red Alert 200+ days before the 2015 Legislative Election.


"Post" is a binary indicator: 0 for the 2013 Election, 1 for the 2015 Election.

"Red Alert 6 Days Before \* Post": Difference-in-Differences estimator for localities last treated 6 days before the 2015 Legislative Election.

"Red Alert 200+ Days Before \* Post": Difference-in-Differences estimator for localities last treated 200+ days before the last treated 2015 Legislative Election.

Control variables: demographic density; population size; distance from the Gaza Strip; nighttime luminosity level (as a proxy to economic development); area and locality-level fixed effects.


Figure 1: Red Alerts in Israel based on Distance to 2015's Election: 75-150km from the Gaza Strip



*Notes:* The map displays Red Alerts in Israel, highlighting only alerts occurring between 75-150 km from the Gaza Strip (shown in orange). The different colors indicate the temporal distance between the last Red Alert experienced by each locality and the 2015 Legislative Election. Grey areas within the 75-150 km range are either partially out of range, Arab localities, or non-jurisdictional areas. *Source:* Israel's Home Front Command.




Figure 2: Difference in Likud's Vote Share Over Time




## A Appendix

Figure A1: Daily Probability of New Red Alert



*Note:* The daily probability of a new Red Alert is estimated via Logit model considering Red Alerts data from 2014 to 2023.

Figure A2: Difference in Right Wing bloc's Vote Share Over Time



Comparison to Control Group: - - 200+ days vs No Red Alert — 6 days vs No Red Alert

Figure A3: Difference in Turnout Over Time

